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ABSTRACT: This Insight tackles a recent judgment of the CJEU, Toufik Lounes (Court of Justice, judgment 
of 14 November 2017, case C-165/16, Toufik Lounes v. Secretary of State for the Home Department), 
where the CJEU was asked to rule on the case of a EU national, Ms García Omazábal, who had exer-
cised her free movement rights, later acquiring the citizenship of the host State while also retaining 
her nationality of origin. The Court has further investigated the scope ratione personae of Directive 
2004/38 and Art. 21, para. 1, TFEU, so to clarify whether, in the scenario above, the EU national and 
her third-country national spouse could still be considered “beneficiaries” under Directive 2004/38. 
The CJEU answered as follows: while Directive 2004/38 is not applicable in the situation above, Art. 21, 
para. 1, TFEU shall instead be applied so as to prevent the EU national holding a dual citizenship to be 
treated less favourably than a EU national having the citizenship of his country of origin only, and 
therefore having the EU national’s right to family life unreasonably disrupted. Against this backdrop, 
the Insight first highlights the merits of the decision, by also investigating its positive effects within the 
Brexit process. Secondly, it discloses a main shortcoming that is likely to weaken the overall protec-
tion granted to EU citizens, i.e. the CJEU choice to disregard the connection between the provisions on 
the EU citizenship and the respect of fundamental rights. 
 




In the Toufik Lounes case, the CJEU has been asked to clarify the boundaries of Di-
rective 2004/381 and the meaning of the EU citizenship. The related judgement,2 hereby 
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commented, has two main merits: it represents a further step towards the enhance-
ment of the EU citizenship as the “fundamental status of nationals of the Member 
States”,3 and it is likely to have a beneficial impact in the long term, indirectly shaping 
the future relationship between the EU and the UK. Nevertheless, it also discloses a few 
shortcomings, mainly related to the CJEU choice not to entirely clarify some of the is-
sues arising from its dynamic approach in this field. 
Against this backdrop, after presenting the dispute in the main proceeding, the AG 
Opinion, and the CJEU ruling, this Insight will specifically focus on two elements. First, it will 
investigate the need to accommodate the relevance of fundamental rights anytime where 
EU citizens’ rights are involved; second, it will briefly examine the post-Brexit implications. 
II. The dispute at the main proceeding and the preliminary question 
In 1996 Ms García Omazábal, a Spanish national, moved to the United Kingdom for 
studying purposes. She started working full time at the Turkish Embassy in London in 
2004, and on 12th August 2009 she received the British citizenship. At this time she de-
cided to retain her Spanish nationality.  
On 1st January 2014 Ms García Omazábal married in a religious ceremony Mr 
Lounes, an Algerian national, who had entered the United Kingdom on 20th January 
2010. Despite his visitor visa being valid for six-months only, Mr Lounes overstayed ille-
gally in the British territory until he met and then married Ms García Omazábal. The 
couple has been residing in the United Kingdom since then. 
The couple also married in a civil ceremony held in London on 16th May 2014. A few 
weeks before the civil ceremony, on 15th April 2014, Mr Lounes applied for a resident 
card as family member of an EEA (European Economic Area) national, thus relying on 
the EEA Regulations 2006, which amount to the UK transposition of Directive 2004/38. 
On 22nd May 2014, such an application was rejected on the basis that Mr Lounes’ 
wife could no longer be considered an “EEA national” under the abovementioned EU 
provision. According to the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ms García 
Omazábal lost the status of “beneficiary” within the meaning of Directive 2004/38 as 
soon as she was given British nationality. As a consequence, her husband could no 
longer rely on the Directive provisions that would otherwise enable him to obtain a res-
idence card as a “family member” of an EEA national. It is worth mentioning that a few 
 
Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 
72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC. 
2 Court of Justice, judgment of 14 November 2017, case C-165/16, Toufik Lounes v. Secretary of State 
for the Home Department. 
3 Court of Justice: judgment of 20 September 2001, case C-184/99, Rudy Grzelczyk v. Centre public 
d'aide sociale d'Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve, para. 31; judgment 17 September 2002, case C-413/99, 
Baumbast and R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, para. 82. 
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days before that refusal, Mr Lounes was also issued with a notice acknowledging his 
breach of the immigration rules and the decision to deport him from the country. 
Disappointed by such situation, Mr Lounes brought a claim to the High Court of Jus-
tice (England and Wales) challenging the compliance of the decision of 22nd May 2014 
with two specific provisions of EU law: Directive 2004/38 and Art. 21 TFEU. The High 
Court of Justice (hereinafter also “the referring Court”) suspended the proceeding in or-
der to begin a preliminary reference procedure and ask the CJEU to clarify whether Ms 
García Omazábal, and consequently Mr Lounes, could still be regarded as “beneficiar-
ies” under Art. 3, para. 1, Directive 2004/38, notwithstanding the circumstance that, af-
ter having exercised her rights under Directive 2004/38, Ms García Omazábal has now 
become a British citizen.4 
III. The Opinion of AG Bot 
The Opinion delivered by AG Bot focuses on three main points.5  
First, AG Bot clarifies that the dispute at the main proceeding falls under the field of ap-
plication of EU law, thus triggering the CJEU jurisdiction on this matter. The rationale behind 
such conclusion is not only quite logical but also “obvious”:6 the AG recalls that “[it] was by 
virtue of the actual exercise of her rights of free movement and residence that Ms García 
Ormazábal was entitled to a right of permanent residence in the United Kingdom”.7 
A second aspect amounts to the possibility for Ms García Ormazábal and therefore 
for her spouse to be qualified as “beneficiaries” under Directive 2004/38. Again, the rea-
soning of AG Bot is at time straightforward and convincing. After recalling that Directive 
2004/38 does not confer any autonomous right on third-country nationals,8 the AG 
highlights that Art. 3, para. 1, of that Directive confers the status of “beneficiary” to EU 
citizens that are residing in a Member State other than the State of their nationality.9 As 
already pointed out by the CJEU,10 firstly, the provisions of the Directive clearly state 
that its field of application ratione personae is limited to the situation just described; 
secondly, it is a well-established principle of international law that individuals enjoy an 
 
4 Toufik Lounes v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, cit., para. 27. 
5 Opinion of AG Bot delivered on 30 May 2017, case C-165/16, Toufik Lounes v. Secretary of State for 
the Home Department. 
6 Ibid., para. 36. 
7 Ibid., para. 37. 
8 Ibid., para. 44. 
9 Ibid., para. 50. 
10 Court of Justice: judgment of 17 May 2017, case C-133/15, H.C. Chavez-Vilchez et al. v. Raad van 
bestuur van de Sociale verzekeringsbank et al.; judgment of 12 March 2014, case-456/12, O. v. Minister 
voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel and Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel v. B. (“O. and B.”); 
judgment of 11 December 2007, case C-291/05, Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie v. R. N. 
G. Eind; judgment of 7 July 1992, case C-370/90, The Queen v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Surinder 
Singh, ex parte Secretary of State for Home Department.  
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unconditional right of residence within each and every State they are nationals. Hence, 
the field of application of Directive 2004/38 is not intended to cover scenarios other 
than the one outlined in its provisions. The ultimate conclusion of that reasoning being 
that – since Ms García Omazábal has acquired the British nationality – the situation at 
the main proceeding ceased to fall under Directive 2004/38.11 This leads to the ac-
knowledgment that Mr Lounes shall not be granted a derived right of residence on the 
basis of Directive 2004/38. 
As a third point, AG Bot stresses that Art. 21, para. 1, TFEU should be investigated so 
to assess whether a “derived right of residence” could eventually be recognised under 
that provision. Despite some factual differences between some previous CJEU case-law12 
and the situation affecting Ms García Ormazábal and Mr Lounes, AG Bot expresses the 
opinion that the CJEU should follow the same reasoning adopted in O. and B., i.e. ac-
knowledging and accommodating the importance of the right to private and family life. 
Hence, the effectiveness of the rights under Art. 21, para. 1, TFEU requires the pro-
visions of the Directive to be applied mutatis mutandis,13 so to ensure that “Union citi-
zens, such as Ms García Ormazábal, who have acquired the nationality of the host 
Member State following and by reason of residence under and in conformity with the 
conditions set out in Article 16 of the Directive, [are] able to continue the family life they 
have until then led in that State with their spouse, a third-country national”.14 
IV. The CJEU ruling and the enhanced application of Directive 2004/38 
The CJEU ruling is very much aligned to the AG Opinion: not only does the CJEU share 
the outcome suggested by the AG, but the legal arguments advanced to reach such a 
conclusion are the same.  
With regard to Directive 2004/38, the Court recalls that it does not confer third-
country nationals an autonomous right of free movement and residence. This entitle-
ment is in fact subject to the circumstance that a EU citizen is exercising or has exer-
cised his free movement rights.15 This observation also implies that whenever a EU citi-
zen is residing in the State of his nationality,16 he enjoys an unconditional right of resi-
dence which stems from the international law principle that States cannot refuse the 
right to enter and reside to their own nationals. The Court has therefore to 
 
11 Opinion of AG Bot, Toufik Lounes v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, cit., para. 65.  
12 The Queen v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Surinder Singh, ex parte Secretary of State for 
Home Department, cit.; Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie v. R. N. G. Eind, cit.; O. and B., cit. 
E. GUILD, S v Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel (C-457/12) / O v Minister voor Immigratie, Inte-
gratie en Asiel (C-456/12), in Journal of Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law, 2014, p. 284 et seq. 
13 Opinion of AG Bot, Toufik Lounes v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, cit., para. 79. 
14 Ibid., para. 90. 
15 Toufik Lounes v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, cit., para. 47. 
16 Ibid., para. 48. 
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acknowledge that, as soon as Ms García Ormazábal received the British nationality, her 
right to reside in the UK ceased to be linked to Directive 2004/38, being instead directly 
connected to her new citizenship status. Since Directive 2004/38 can no longer apply to 
Ms García Ormazábal, Mr Lounes is subsequently prevented from enjoying the protec-
tion foreseen by Directive 2004/38.17 
Secondly, the CJEU assesses whether Mr Lounes could enjoy a derived right of resi-
dence in the UK relying on a dynamic interpretation of Art. 21, para. 1, TFEU.18 Following 
the same approach of the AG, the Court stresses how the need to ensure the effective-
ness of such provisions entails a duty to provide third-country nationals with a derived 
right of residence anytime where EU nationals’ rights under Art. 21 TFEU would other-
wise be jeopardised.19 
Additionally the Court discusses two further points. First it highlights that the dis-
pute in main proceeding is embedded into the EU field of application.20 The Court quite 
properly outlines that the situation at stake is not only linked to the exercise of a right 
under EU law, but it actually entangles the core value of the European Union to foster 
the integration among the Member States and achieve an “ever closer union”.21 Ms Gar-
cía Ormazábal’s choice to apply for, and obtain, British nationality shall therefore be 
seen as a willingness to “seal” her connection with the British nation by becoming “per-
manently integrated in that State”.22 Second, preventing Mr Lounes from receiving a 
right of permanent residence on the grounds of his relationship with Ms García Or-
mazábal would clearly amount to a disruption of their right to family life. More precise-
ly, the Court is of the opinion that denying such derived right to Mr Lounes would lead 
Ms García Ormazábal to be treated less favourably than EU citizens having relied on 
free movement rights but having the nationality of their country of origin only.23 
The Court therefore concludes that, despite not being directly applicable, Directive 
2004/38 should be applied by analogy. This enables the third country national to invoke 
Art. 21, para.1, TFEU, and thus obtain a derived right of residence to be exercised under 
the same conditions set out by the Directive itself.24  
 
17 Ibid., paras 42-44. 
18 Ibid., para. 45. 
19 Ibid., para. 48. 
20 Ibid., para. 50. 
21 See European Coucil, Solemn Declaration on the European Union, 19 June 1983, available in Bulle-
tin of the European Communities, No. 6/1983. 
22 Toufik Lounes v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, cit., para. 57. 
23 Ibid., para. 59. 
24 Ibid., para. 62. 
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V. Non-discrimination and right to family life: the marginalisation 
of fundamental rights 
The value of Toufik Lounes ruling is undeniable from several viewpoints. First and 
foremost, the CJEU ruling confirms that the main priority of the EU is still to achieve the 
fair integration and the equal treatment of all its nationals. Secondly, the Toufik Lounes 
judgment is expected to shape the future relationship between the UK and the EU in 
the aftermath of Brexit.  
v.1. EU citizenship and non-discrimination on grounds of nationality: 
two sides of the same coin 
A closer look to the Toufik Lounes ruling reveals that the analysis of non-discrimination and 
right to family life carried out by the CJEU could (and should) have been more in-depth. 
With regard to non-discrimination, this principle is only indirectly mentioned by the 
CJEU in para. 59, when the Court points out that an EU national holding a dual EU citizen-
ship should not be treated less favourably than an EU national having the citizenship of 
one Member State only. Notwithstanding the connection with both Zambrano25 and 
McCarthy26 cases, the CJEU does not make any reference to those rulings. With specific 
regard to the latter, AG Bot only justifies his choice not to rely on McCarthy arguing that, 
unlike Ms García Ormazábal, Ms McCarthy had not exercised her right to free move-
ment.27 The lack of a reference to Zambrano, on the contrary, is not explained by AG Bot. 
Despite the factual differences and even though the choice to disregard Zambrano and 
McCarthy does not impact on the outcome of the decision itself, it seems that a reference 
to both decisions was indeed recommended. Toufik Lounes is in fact a crossroad of those 
rulings: as in Zambrano, a derived residence right was at stake; as in McCarthy the dual 
nationality of the EU national was likely to constitute an obstacle to the free enjoyment of 
the rights under the EU citizenship. Therefore, Toufik Lounes would have provided a good 
opportunity for the Court to explain the approach followed within the decisions above, so 
to clarify that Zambrano and McCarthy shall not be seen as conflicting decisions, being 
instead expressions of a single, consistent approach.28 The Court has thus missed the 
chance to state – once and for all – that Art. 21, para. 1, TFEU, i.e. the genuine enjoyment 
of the EU citizens’ rights, can indeed be undermined, first, by the removal/refusal to admit 
 
25 Court of Justice, judgment of 8 March 2011, case C-34/09, Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v. Office na-
tional de l’emploi (ONEm). 
26 Court of Justice, judgment of 5 May 2011, case C-434/09, Shirley McCarthy v. Secretary of State for 
the Home Department. 
27 Opinion of AG Bot, Toufik Lounes v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, cit., para. 49. 
28 A. WIESBROCK, Disentangling the “Union Citizenship Puzzle”? The McCarthy case, in European Law 
Review, 2011, p. 861 et seq. 
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a family member under Directive 2004/38; second, notwithstanding the actual existence 
of a cross-border element in the situation at stake. 
Moreover, Toufik Lounes would have represented the path to cast the enhanced val-
ue of the EU citizenship in stone (i.e. by securing its link with fundamental rights), and to 
provide at least some clarifications regarding its extent.29 At this juncture it should be re-
called that the EU citizenship represents the fundamental status of the nationals of the 
Member States: this statement implies the need to ensure the respect of human rights 
anytime where the EU citizenship is at stake. If in Zambrano the lack of reference to fun-
damental rights could partially be justified by acknowledging that the Charter was yet to 
become legally binding,30 this argument does not cover Toufik Lounes ruling. 
Furthermore another issue raised by Zambrano31 and yet to be solved by the CJEU 
amounts to the concept of “reverse discrimination”.32 Since the Toufik Lounes case in-
volved a EU national having a dual citizenship, it indeed challenged the problem related 
to the equal treatment of all EU nationals. More precisely, while Ms García Ormazábal 
was able to rely on the protection of Art. 21 TFEU by virtue of her having retained Span-
ish nationality and relying upon free movement provisions before receiving the British 
passport, a British national not satisfying the two requirements above would have been 
prevented from enjoying such protection. As stated in Zambrano, such an outcome 
cannot be justified by arguing that – in order for the provisions on EU citizenship to ap-
ply – at least a potential cross-border element must be met.33 Hence, it has to be 
acknowledged that the expansion of the rights attached to the EU citizenship does risk 
putting Member State’s nationals in a disadvantaged position. As a matter of fact, if Mr 
Lounes’ spouse was a British national having that nationality only, most likely Mr 
Lounes would have been unable to remain in the UK and continue his family life there. 
On one hand the Directive 2004/38 and Art. 21 TFEU would have been inapplicable; on 
the other hand, the current approach to the right to family life and the circumstance 
that Mr Lounes originally infringed the UK immigration rules, would have probably led 
to his removal from the British territory.  
The observations above clearly outline the needs presented at the beginning of this 
sub-section, i.e. to interpret and apply the provisions on EU citizenship taking into due 
account the respect of fundamental rights so to prevent any violation of those rights 
and/or tolerate paradoxical situations like the one just described.  
 
29 Opinion of AG Sharpston delivered on 30 September 2010, case C-34/09, Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano 
v. Office national de l’emploi (ONEm), para. 75 et seq. 
30 Ibid., para. 151 et seq. 
31 Ibid., para. 123 et seq. 
32 H. VAN EIJKEN, S.A. DE VRIES, A New Route into the Promised Land? Being a European Citizen after 
Ruiz Zambrano, in European Law Review, 2011, p. 710 et seq. 
33 Ibid., p. 711 et seq.; A. WIESBROCK, Disentangling the “Union Citizenship Puzzle”? The McCarthy 
Case, cit., p. 866. 
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v.2. The CJEU vis-à-vis the “right to family life”: limiting or enhancing 
its potential?  
With regard to the right to family life, the reasoning followed by the Court is convincing: by 
moving to the UK and settling there to such an extent that enabled her to become British 
national, Ms García Ormazábal clearly proved her intention to build a family life in that 
country. The decision to remove her spouse from the British territory would have there-
fore amounted to a disruption of such right and hence infringed Art. 21, para. 1, TFEU. 
Notwithstanding its clarity, what is surprising about the Court’s reasoning is the lack 
of any reference to the European provisions which specifically protect the right to family 
life. Neither Art. 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the 
Charter), nor Art. 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) are mentioned in the decision, thus leading to the ques-
tion whether such omission has been intentional or purely casual.  
A look at the previous rulings concerning similar situations would support the for-
mer – rather than the latter – interpretation.34 When free movement rights are involved, 
and EU citizenship is at stake, the Court is in fact oriented towards dismissing the in-
volvement of human rights rather than engaging in a proper analysis on human rights.  
Before addressing the reasons why such an approach shall not be entirely em-
braced, it is worth investigating the rationale behind the Court’s choice to opt for it. Two 
observations can be made at this regard.  
First, a reference to the Charter and the ECHR provisions would probably represent 
an additional burden to a set of decisions which are already quite controversial in 
themselves. Since Member States are already reluctant to fully embrace the CJEU rul-
ings in this field, the Court’s self-restraint might be interpreted as an attempt not to ex-
acerbate Member States’ reactions. 
A second remark focuses on the content of both Art. 7 of the Charter and Art. 8 
ECHR.35 As highlighted within the “Explanations to the Charter of Fundamental Rights”,36 
the correspondence between the two provisions implies that the meaning and scope of 
the two norms are identical. Equally, so are “the limitations which may legitimately be 
 
34 A. WIESBROCK, Disentangling the “Union Citizenship Puzzle”? The McCarthy Case, cit. p. 870 et seq.; 
S. REYNOLDS, Exploring the "Intrinsic Connection" between Free Movement and the Genuine Enjoyment 
Test: Reflections on EU Citizenship after Iida, in European Law Review, 2013, p. 376 et seq.  
35 A. BULTRINI, I rapporti fra Carta dei diritti fondamentali e Convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo 
dopo Lisbona: potenzialità straordinarie per lo sviluppo della tutela dei diritti umani in Europa, in Il Diritto 
dell’Unione europea, 2009, p. 700 et seq. 
36 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, p. 17 et seq. J.P. JACQUÉ, The Explana-
tions Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in S. PEERS, T. HERVEY, J. 
KENNER, A. WARD, The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. A Commentary, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014, p. 
1715 et seq. 
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imposed”37 on the right to private and family life. The ultimate consequence of such 
correspondence is the acknowledgment that the European Court of Human Rights rul-
ings on Art. 8 ECHR shape the content of Art. 7 of the Charter. In other words, the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights jurisprudence, which already constitutes a leading refer-
ence in the field of human rights,38 becomes intertwined when a Charter provision is 
perfectly shaped on the ECHR.39 
Against this backdrop, the CJEU approach not to mention the Charter (and the 
ECHR) can therefore be seen as an attempt to enhance rather than decrease the im-
portance of family life. This latter remark can be easily explained by pointing out that 
the interpretation and application by the European Court of Human Rights of Art. 8 
ECHR are often contradictory and inconsistent.40 This is especially true when it comes to 
balancing the right to private and family life with States’ prerogative to control their 
borders and to manage their immigration rules,41 since the European Court of Human 
Rights is keen to recognise that States shall enjoy a wide margin of appreciation. This 
approach, not only triggers a number of unwanted consequences (such as the idea that 
States removal decisions can be tolerated under Art. 8 ECHR if family life can be recre-
ated in another country),42 but it clearly paves the way to the implementation of quite 
low standards when assessing the respect to private and family life. 
Considering the scenario just presented – and recalling that within the dispute at 
the main proceeding the third country national overstayed his permit to reside in the 
UK, thus breaching British immigration rules – it can be argued that the CJEU made a 
wise call by avoiding referring to either Art. 8 ECHR or Art. 7 of the Charter. This being 
the case, the approach of the CJEU would be justified by the idea of securing complete 
 
37 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, cit., Explanation on Article 7 – Respect 
for private and family life, p. 20. 
38 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, cit., Explanation on Article 52 – Scope 
and interpretation of rights and principles, p. 33. 
39 S. PEERS, S. PRECHAL, Article 52, in S. PEERS, T. HERVEY, J. KENNER, A. WARD, The EU Charter of Funda-
mental Rights. A Commentary, cit., p. 1490 et seq.; K. LENAERTS, J.A. GUTIÉRREZ-FONS, The Place of the Char-
ter in the EU Constitutional Edifice, in S. PEERS, T. HERVEY, J. KENNER, A. WARD, The EU Charter of Fundamen-
tal Rights. A Commentary, cit., p. 1559 et seq.; L. BETTEN, The EU Charter on Fundamental Rights: a Trojan 
Horse or a Mouse?, in The International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 
2001, p. 151 et seq. 
40 V. CHETAIL, C. BAULOZ, Research Handbook on International Law and Migration, Cheltenham: Ed-
ward Elgar, 2014, p. 204; H. LAMBERT, The European Court of Human Rights and the Right of Refugees and 
Other Persons in Need of Protection to Family Reunion, in International Journal of Refugee Law, 1999, p. 
429 et seq. 
41 European Court of Human Rights: judgment of 14 June 2011, no 38058/09, Osman v. Denmark; 
judgment of 12 October 2006, no. 13178/03, Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium; judg-
ment of 21 December 2001, no. 32465/96, Sen v. The Netherlands. 
42 European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 28 May 1998, no. 10730/84, Berrehab v. The Neth-
erlands. 
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flexibility in shaping the right to family life, without subjecting its protection to an unsat-
isfactory case-law, i.e. the European Court of Human Rights one. 
Notwithstanding the remarks developed so far, the lack of reference to the existing 
provisions protecting the right to private and family life still has two shortcomings. 
While an enhanced legal reasoning from the CJEU would not have changed the outcome 
of the Toufik Lounes judgment itself, it would have constituted a way to clarify the ex-
tent of the EU citizenship and to firmly secure its protection.  
First, the omission related to Art. 7 of the Charter amounts to an unreasonable self-
restraint of the CJEU. According to both Arts 52 and 53 of the Charter, and the related 
Explanations, the full correspondence between a Charter provision and an ECHR rule 
does not preclude the application of the so called “maximum standard of protection”.43 
Although the implication of this statement is yet to be clarified by the CJEU,44 the Expla-
nations focusing on Art. 52 imply that if the protection granted by the EU is stronger 
than the one foreseen under the ECHR, the former standard should be implemented. In 
a situation like the one of Ms García Omazábal a reference to the Charter would have 
therefore constituted an extremely authoritative support. 
A second shortcoming is the lack of reference to Art. 8 ECHR itself: despite the obser-
vations above, such reference could be beneficial. More precisely, the mutual respect and 
consideration denoting the relationship between the CJEU and the European Court of 
Human Rights could have been used as a way to increase the protection of family life. By 
linking the enhanced interpretation of the right to family life to the provisions above, the 
CJEU had the opportunity to indirectly influence the European Court of Human Rights’ ap-
proach towards the right to private and family life, and to eventually push forward with its 
scrutiny within such provision.45 
Finally, with specific regard to the UK and in the light of Brexit, the abovementioned 
scenario should be particularly welcomed. As known, at some point46 the EU provisions 
will cease to apply in the British territory and the CJEU will no longer have jurisdiction. The 
ECHR and the European Court of Human Rights will therefore remain the sole interna-
tional instrument and jurisdictional body capable of effectively promoting the enforce-
ment of human rights’ protection. The interpretation of Art. 8 ECHR thus becomes of par-
amount importance towards the effectiveness of the human rights protection in the UK. 
 
43 S. PEERS, S. PRECHAL, Article 52, in S. PEERS, T. HERVEY, J. KENNER, A. WARD, The EU Charter of Funda-
mental Rights. A Commentary, cit., p. 1455 et seq. 
44 Court of Justice, judgment of 26 February 2013, case C-399/11, Stefano Melloni v. Ministerio Fiscal. 
45 A. ROSAS, Balancing Fundamental Rights in EU Law, in Cambridge Yearbook of European Studies, 
2014, p. 347 et seq.; S. PEERS, S. PRECHAL, Article 52, in S. PEERS, T. HERVEY, J. KENNER, A. WARD, The EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights. A Commentary, cit., p. 1496 et seq. 
46 See Section VI below. 
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VI. The additional value of the Toufik Lounes ruling: its 
implications for Brexit  
Further to the observations made at the end of the previous section, the Toufik Lounes 
decision will impact on Brexit under another point of view.  
The clarifications provided by the CJEU will indeed be relevant not only in the next 
year, but will be binding during the “transition period” as well. In order to appreciate the 
importance of Toufik Lounes, a quick look at the latest version of the Draft Agreement on 
the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the Eu-
ropean Union and the European Atomic Energy Community is therefore needed (the Draft 
Agreement).47  
The agreement tackles citizens’ residence rights in Part Two, Chapter 1. The whole 
Chapter can be described as a substantive recognition of the provisions of Directive 
2004/38.48 
With specific focus on the rights that EU citizens residing in the UK and UK nationals 
residing in one of the Member States will have in the future, the draft accommodates the 
binding effect of the provisions of Directive 2004/38 until the end of the transition period.49  
Furthermore, the draft’s provisions pertinent to citizens’ rights are most likely to be-
come enforceable once the agreement will be finalised: as clarified by the draft itself, 
the text highlighted in green, such as all Part Two of the Draft, “is agreed at negotiators’ 
level, and will only be subject to technical legal revisions in the coming weeks”.50 This 
means that the interpretation of Directive 2004/38 and its analogic application via Art. 
21 TFEU are going to be binding in the UK until the end of 2020. As a consequence, the 
Toufik Lounes decision – which, as shown, is already at the cutting-edge of the Court’s 
case-law by itself – is likely to have a ground-breaking effect considering that it will have 
an impact in the UK for almost two additional years after the official divorce between 
the UK and the EU. 
The future CJEU case-law regarding citizens’ rights might even have a broader effect 
insofar as Art. 151 of the Draft Agreement foresees that the CJEU will have jurisdiction 
to give preliminary rulings “where, in a case which has commenced at first instance 
within 8 years from the end of the transition period before a court or tribunal in the 
United Kingdom, a question is raised concerning the interpretation of Part Two of this 
Agreement, and where that court or tribunal considers that a decision on that question 
 
47 European Commission, Task Force for the Preparation and Conduct of the Negotiations with the 
United Kingdom under Article 50 TEU, Draft Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Communi-
ty, 19 March 2018, TF50 (2018) 35 – Commission to EU27. 
48 Ibid., Arts 8 and 10. 
49 Ibid., Art. 121. 
50 Ibid., p. 1. 
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is necessary to enable it to give judgment in that case”.51 Hence, it appears that the 
CJEU will certainly have the opportunity and power to further improve the protection of 
citizens’ rights in the near future.  
The observations made so far firstly confirm that EU citizenship is a concept at time 
extremely dynamic and of great inner potential.52 Furthermore, this brief overview of 
the Draft Agreement seems to be capable of appeasing some of the concerns that have 
been recently raised with regard to the protection of EU citizens’ rights living in the UK 
in the aftermath of Brexit.53 
VII. Concluding remarks 
The analysis carried out in this paper has highlighted the value, but also the shortcom-
ings of the CJEU approach towards the EU citizenship.  
The dynamic interpretation devoted by the CJEU to both Directive 2004/38 and Art. 21 
TFEU should be welcomed since it aims at increasing the protection of EU citizens and this 
effect is likely to outlive Brexit. Nevertheless, the lack of full clarity of the Toufik Lounes 
judgment may represent an obstacle towards the effective improvement of citizens’ rights. 
In this latter regard, the Insight has stressed the need to acknowledge, once and for 
all, the role played by human rights within the interpretation and application of the pro-
visions indicated above. The Court’s self-restraint can no longer be tolerated as this ap-
proach undermines the consistency of the CJEU case-law. Finally, by stressing the link 
between the enhancement of citizens’ rights and the effective protection of fundamen-
tal rights, the Court will not only prevent such inconvenience, but also secure its case-
law under the shield of the quintessential normative instruments in the European terri-
tory: the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the ECHR. 
 
51 Ibid., Art. 151. 
52 E. HERLIN-KARNELL, European Arrest Warrant Cases and the Principles of Non-discrimination and EU 
Citizenship, in Modern Law Review, 2010, p. 824. 
53 K. HUGHES, Brexit and the Right to Remain of EU Nationals, in Public Law, 2017, p. 94 et seq.; G.M. 
GONZÁLES, ‘BREXIT’. Consequences for Citizenship of the Union and Residence Rights, in Maastricht Journal 
of European and Comparative Law, 2016, p. 796 et seq.  
